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Legal and political expectations of the neighbour countries 




Signing of the EU-Ukraine Action Plan on 21 February 2005 marked the start of the 
new period in bilateral relations between the EU and Ukraine. The Action Plan 
resulted from the newly launched European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) towards 
countries, which share common geographical, economic and political borders with 
the EU. The Action Plan pursues the objective to enhance Ukraine’s partnership 
with the EU through enabling the access of Ukrainian undertakings to the EU 
Internal Market and other EU common policies. 
Legal scholars and practitioners face the question; does the ENP provide an 
appropriate development in relations between the EU and neighbours? Do legal and 
political aims of the ENP respond to expectations of neighbour countries? This 
article endeavours to find answers to these contemporary questions. The article 
comprise of two parts. In the first part, I focus on the expectations of the neighbour 
countries before the emergence of the ENP. In the second part, I speculate whether 
the expectations of the EU neighbours have been adequately met by the ENP after 
its launch. In the conclusion I forecast measures which could improve the 
effectiveness of the ENP. 
  
1. The expectations of neighbour countries before the emergence of the ENP 
Before the emergence of the ENP the EU did not pursue a unified policy towards its 
close neighbours. Accession of countries of Central and Eastern Europe was one of 
the major priorities of the EU external policy before 2003. The EU equipped its 
“pre-accession” and “accession” policies with stronger conditionality and more 
stringent monitoring process to ensure that candidate countries implement the entire 
acquis communautaire before obtaining formal EU membership. Consequently, 
third countries wishing to integrate into the EU accepted the conditionality 
methodology of the latest EU enlargement as an adequate pattern of the “stick and 
carrot” EU external policy, which could eventually lead to full EU membership. 
Furthermore, the relative vagueness of Article 49 of the TEU “Any European State 




which respects the principles set out in Article 6(1) may apply to become a member 
of the Union” and the fact that the absorption capacity was absent from elements of 
the Copenhagen criteria encouraged the far reaching European aspirations of some 
third countries. 
The “pre-ENP” relations of the EU with neighbour countries were characterised by 
a clear geographical approach. In the Mediterranean region, therefore, the EU engaged 
the twelve Mediterranean countries1 into ambitious Barcelona Process, which is a 
product of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, agreed by the EU foreign ministers 
and twelve Mediterranean partners in Barcelona in November 1995. The ultimate 
objectives of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership are enshrined in the Barcelona 
Declaration.2 These objectives aim at the establishment of a zone of peace, 
prosperity and stability in the Mediterranean region without formal EU 
membership.3 The ambitious goals of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership are 
supplemented by the Barcelona Process, endorsed by the Common Strategy for the 
Mediterranean Region (adopted by the European Council in Santa Maria da Feira in 
June 2000). The Barcelona Declaration lays out objectives in three major areas: 1) the 
political and security; 2) the economic; 3) the social and cultural. Among the specific 
targets of the Barcelona Declaration are: a) the creation of a zone of peace and 
stability based on shared fundamental values, particularly the respect for human 
rights and democracy; b) the construction of a region of shared prosperity through 
the gradual establishment of a free trade area by the target date of 2010.4 These far-
reaching objectives circumscribe the tentative boundaries of the acquis 
communautaire to be implemented by the Mediterranean countries. 
The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership is implemented bilaterally through the EMAAs 
negotiated between the EU (EC and its Member States) and the twelve Euro-
Mediterranean countries on the basis of Article 310 EC. The EMAAs aim to 
establish, over a transitional period, free trade in industrial goods and the progressive 
liberalisation of trade in the agricultural sector; liberalisation of trade in services; 
cooperation in political, economic, social and cultural matters, and justice and home 
affairs. Commentators consider the EMAAs ‘a half-way house between Lome and 
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the EU, characterised by political dialogue, security ties, free trade and sectoral 
cooperation’, with an explicit objective of opening EMAA countries’ markets to 
intense European competition.5 
Notwithstanding their common objectives, the EMAAs display explicit 
differentiation and conditionality of EU foreign policy. Each of the EMAAs shows 
specific EU policy approaches towards a particular Mediterranean country. 
Therefore, the scope of the acquis communautaire to be adopted by the EMAA 
countries is not uniform. The EMAAs may be arranged into several groups or 
“generations”. The EC has concluded “first-generation” association agreements with 
Turkey, Malta and Cyprus (which are not strictly EMAAs) with the purpose of 
establishing customs unions. In the end, only the EC-Turkey customs union has 
come into existence as a “consolation prize” for the delay of its membership 
perspectives. Customs unions with Malta and Cyprus (the customs union with 
Cyprus was partly achieved6) were never established, though these countries 
eventually became full Member States. The EC-Israel EMAA occupies a special 
niche within the whole Euro-Mediterranean Partnership since it envisages the 
unprecedented mutual harmonisation of legislation in the course of the liberalisation 
of economic relations. The remaining EMAAs belong to the next group. Therein the 
acquis communautaire scope suits the comparatively limited objectives of Euro-
Mediterranean Partnership which carefully avoids any perspective of EU 
membership. Therefore this section focuses on the EMAAs with Turkey, Israel, and 
Tunisia as the most typical examples of the abovementioned generation of EMAA. 
“Pre-ENP” EU relations towards the Western Balkan countries, instead, were governed 
by the Stabilisation and Association Process (SAP).7 Its main objectives target the 
enhancement of the Western Balkan countries’ progress in economic and political 
development; regional trade and cooperation; and cooperation in justice and home 
affairs.8 The SAP supports the countries’ development and preparations for future 
EU membership by combining three main instruments: 1)SAA; 2) autonomous trade 
measures and 3) substantial financial assistance. By taking part in the SAP, the 
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Western Balkan countries have agreed to abide to EU conditionality in return for the 
remote objective of full EU membership.9 
The SAAs were devised as “a new type of EA”. They are association agreements 
concluded on the basis of Article 310 EC.10 Indeed, the SAAs resemble the EAs in 
their objectives, structure, institutional framework and sectoral cooperation, but 
avoid any vagueness inherent to the EAs, inter alia with regard to the nature and 
priorities of the approximation process. Experts consider the SAAs an ‘appropriate 
alternative to the EAs’ or a purpose-tailored association which offers the Western 
Balkan countries the tentative status of ‘potential candidate country’.11 Regardless of 
political objectives, the SAAs provide a solid foundation for the implementation of 
the comprehensive acquis communautaire by the Western Balkan countries. The 
Preambles of the SAA emphasise the commitment of the SAA countries ‘to 
approximate [their] legislation to that of the Community’ which is one of the 
preconditions of their integration ‘into the political and economic mainstream of 
Europe’ and the acquisition of the status of candidate for EU membership. The 
SAAs are more explicit than the EAs in clarifying the formal criteria for EU 
membership by stating that their future application for EU membership shall be 
considered in accordance with the requirements of the Article 49 TEU, fulfilment of 
the Copenhagen criteria, and the ‘successful implementation of this Agreement, 
notably regarding regional cooperation’. Remarkably, the requirements of regional 
cooperation and regional stability compound the key factors for further development 
and enhancement of the association. 
The SAAs are concluded for ten years in the case of the FYROM, and six years for 
Croatia.12 The same periods of time are given to the Parties to ‘gradually establish a 
free trade area in accordance …and in conformity with those of the GATT 1994 and 
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the WTO rules’,13 and to approximate the SAAs countries’ legislation to that of the 
EU.14 
Finally, in the post USSR area the EC and the EU Member States entered into 
bilateral agreements with all former Soviet republics, except the three Baltic republics. 
The original EC/USSR Trade Development and Cooperation Agreement (TDCA)15 
was supersede by new bilateral agreements with almost all the former Soviet 
republics shortly after the Presidents of Russia, Belarus and Ukraine signed an 
agreement establishing the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and 
acknowledging the end of the Soviet Union.16 Until now, the TDCA continues to be 
the main tool for relations with Belarus and Turkmenistan.17 Owing to the fact that 
the CIS was not given a legal personality, the EU decided to enter into bilateral 
agreements with all former Soviet republics, except the three Baltic republics. Latvia, 
Estonia and Lithuania were invited to sign free trade agreements and subsequently 
the EAs. As a consequence they joined the club of candidate countries for accession. 
Partnership and Cooperation Agreements (PCAs) with Newly Independent States 
(NIS) were signed in spring 1994 with the Russian Federation, Ukraine, Kazakhstan 
and the Kyrgyz Republic. Moldova signed the PCA in July 1994 and Belarus in the 
December of the same year. PCAs with Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia were signed in 
April 1996, and with Uzbekistan that June. Nine out of eleven PCAs are currently in 
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force.18 Certain political considerations inhibit the enactment of the PCAs with 
Belarus and Turkmenistan (signed in March 1998).19 
The PCAs constitute a separate group of “partnership” agreements among 
“association”, “cooperation”, “stabilisation” and “development” agreements entered 
into by the EC.20 As “ad hoc political creations”21 it is rather puzzling to fit the PCAs 
into the order of politicised EU external agreements.22 However, the PCAs may be 
classified as “entry-level” agreements that do not envisage membership, but instead 
endorse potential interest in the further development mutual cooperation between 
Parties. Preambles of the PCAs intentionally omit any reference to “the process of 
European integration” or “the objective of membership in the EU”, as these are 
provided in the EAs and SAAs.23 Besides, the PCAs do not consider the 
establishment of a free trade area with the EC in the same way as the EMAAs. The 
PCAs are aimed solely at the development of close political relations; the promotion 
of trade, investment and harmonious economic relations between the Parties; the 
sustenance of cooperation and the support of efforts by any PCA nation to complete 
its transition to a market economy.24 The PCAs’ objectives merely pave the way for 
further political and economic cooperation between the Parties ‘to provide a basis 
for mutually advantageous economic cooperation; to promote trade and investment 
harmonious economic relations’. The PCA objectives indirectly underline the 
transitional character of the agreements which could eventually lead to a new and 
improved form of cooperation. In this context, the third “generation” EMAAs 
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objectives are more explicit. They promulgate the establishment of a free trade area 
and unequivocally state that the mutual liberalisation of trade and access to their 
respective markets is a major objective of the association.25 
It could be seen that prior the emergence of the ENP the EU neighbour countries 
enjoyed asymmetrical relations with the EU ranging from association agreements to 
partnership and cooperation agreements. Each of these bilateral relations implied 
different expectations on behalf of third countries – parties to the agreement. On the 
one hand, the EU has established the accession model based on strong conditionality 
and monitoring of the acquis implementation by candidate and potential candidate 
countries. On the other hand, the EU launched the Barcelona Process through 
which it intended to engage Mediterranean countries in close political and economic 
cooperation without any perspective of the membership. At the same time, the EU 
kept former USSR republics in the “waiting room” encouraging the latter to 
accelerate their democratic, political and economic reforms in order to upgrade from 
the “entry-level” PCA to a new and enhanced level of partnership with a possibility 
of the full membership in distant future. As a result of this policy, neighbour 
countries have approached different level of relations with the EU. The Barcelona 
Process countries signed association agreements with the EU and moved closer to 
the establishment of a free trade area with the EU. The PCAs have exhausted their 
potential of “entry-level” agreement for most of the PCA countries. Some of the 
PCA countries joined the WTO and have been recognized as market economy 
countries but a minority of the PCA countries remained outside active partnership 
with the EU due to failure of their internal political and economic reforms. 
Consequently, those PCA countries which fulfilled major conditions of the PCA 
called the EU to revisit the framework character of the PCAs and to start a dialog on 
new and much more enhanced level of cooperation with a perspective of much 
hoped EU membership. 
 
2. Expectations of neighbour countries after the emergence of the ENP 
Launch of the ENP in 2003 has not been warmly welcomed by all neighbour 
countries. “Pro-European” PCA countries (Ukraine, Moldova) became openly 
disappointed by absence of the membership perspective in the ENP. Russia decided 
to pull out from the entire ENP initiative and to establish bilateral “Common 
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spaces” project with the EU. Mediterranean countries remained optimistic about a 
chance to develop stronger tailor made arrangements with the EU on bilateral level. 
Balkan countries became more comfortable in their membership expectations 
knowing that there is no competitive dimension of the EU external policy, which 
might hinder their possible accession into the EU. 
In my opinion the reason for such diverse reception of the ENP by neighbour 
countries is concealed in its very foundations. The ENP is based on several core 
stones. One is tailor made approach. It means that neighbour countries may develop 
bilateral relations with the EU to satisfy own national political, economic and legal 
ambitions. Second is strong conditionality which means that in order to develop 
further bilateral relations with the EU neighbour countries are expected to follow 
stringent political conditionality which focuses on implementation of common 
democratic and rule of law values. The process of effective implementation of 
common values is to be closely followed by the EU. Monitoring procedure which 
has been successfully tested during the accession process is applied towards the 
neighbour countries. Third is absence of the EU membership objective. The ENP 
equivocally rejects any possibility of the membership Instead of this the ENP offers 
to neighbour countries several “carrots”: “stake in the EC internal market”; upgrade 
of political cooperation; provision of additional financial assistance through the new 
Neighbourhood Financial Instrument,  
The major challenge for the ENP is the fact that the ENP legal and political 
framework embraces various practices accumulated by the EU from the 
asymmetrical “pre-ENP” period. For instance, the ENP formalises the EU policy of 
conditionality borrowed from the latest accession as its major instrument and pre-
condition of any progress in bilateral EU-neighbour country relations. While fully 
acceptable for the EU accession policy this approach could not be easily accepted by 
some neighbour countries, which are deprived from the perspective of the EU 
membership while participating in the ENP. 
Another reason for problematic reception of the ENP is that it is difficult for some 
neighbour countries to accept the tailor made approach of the ENP. For example, 
“pro- European” PCA countries realised that the ENP placed their bilateral relations 
with the EU behind certain Mediterranean countries, which signed association 
agreement and moved closer to the establishment of a free trade area with the EU. 
Despite realistic possibilities and chances to enhance bilateral relations with the EU 
within the framework of the ENP some “pro- European” neighbour countries 
realised that their participation in the ENP require much more political and 




economic responsibility in order to upgrade their relations with the EU than it was in 
the “pre-ENP” period. 
 
3. Case study on the potential scope and objectives of the ENA 
The objective of this case study is to scrutinise possible differences in expectations 
of the EU and of neighbour countries from the future European Neighbourhood 
Agreements (ENA) between the EU and countries taking part in the ENP. The 
Commission’s Strategy Paper on the ENP envisages that the ENP comprises two 
stages: 1) fulfilment of bilateral Action Plans (AP) during the term from three to five 
years; 2) the negotiation of ENAs “to replace the present generation of bilateral 
agreements, when Action Plan priorities are met. Progress made in this way will 
enable the EU and its partners to agree on longer term goals for the further 
development of relations in the years ahead”.26 For every neighbour country the 
ENA should have considerable political, economic and legal meaning. On the one 
hand, the fact of conclusion of the ENA represents an evidence of the successful 
realisation of the AP, and, therefore, the departure from the first level of the ENP to 
another more advanced level of cooperation with the EU. On the other hand, 
throughout the process of negotiating of each ENA both the EU and neighbour 
countries will endeavour to satisfy their prior expectations. It goes without saying 
that the further success in achieving objectives of future ENAs will certainly depend 
on a reasonable compromise and on at least partial satisfaction of expectations of 
both parties to the agreement. Therefore, we suggest scrutinising possible differences 
in expectations using the case of the future ENA between the EU and Ukraine. The 
EU-Ukraine ENA represents the excellent material for our case study from three 
aspects. First, Ukraine is considered one of key participants for the ENP, which 
emerged in response to accelerating pro European aspirations of the Ukrainian 
society. The very first AP the EU drafted with Ukraine and signed it immediately 
after the sweeping victory of the “Orange” revolution in early 2005. Third, the 
Commission obtained its first mandate to negotiate the ENA with Ukraine. 
Therefore, the case study will comprise two parts. In the first part, it will be 
discussed the scope of the ENA and its objectives in line with the EU policy towards 
Ukraine. In the second part, it will be endeavoured to foresee the position of the 
Ukrainian political elite with regard the objectives and scope of the future ENA. In 
                                                 
26
 Communication from the European Commission “European Neighbourhood Policy Strategy 
Paper”, COM(2004) 373 final. 




the end, we shall discuss whether the example of the future EU – Ukraine ENA 
supports our arguments above. 
 
4. Objectives and potential scope of the ENA with Ukraine to be proposed by 
the EU 
Hitherto, relevant EU external documents have shed hardly any light on the ENAs’ 
objectives. The EU Constitutional Treaty contains separate Title VIII “The Union 
and its Neighbours”. Therein, it is provided that “the Union shall develop a special 
relationship with neighbouring countries, aiming to establish an area of prosperity 
and good neighbourliness, founded on the values of the Union and characterised by 
close and peaceful relations based on cooperation…. the Union may conclude 
specific agreements with the countries concerned. These agreements may contain 
reciprocal rights and obligations as well as the possibility of undertaking activities 
jointly.” This provision, which is unlikely to enter into force in the nearest future due 
to continuing complications around the future of the EU Constitutional Treaty, shed 
very little light on the potential legal nature (either agreement on association or 
partnership or development) of the ENA and its objectives. The only assumption 
that follows from it is that the future ENA will have a cross-pillar character 
“founded on the values of the Union”. In our opinion, till the EU Constitutional 
Treaty enters into force the EU has discretion to choose a legal base for the ENAs 
within the existing EC primary legislation and level of relations with a third country. 
However we argue that, meanwhile, objectives of the future ENAs can be deduced 
from the general objectives of the ENP, which offers to neighbouring countries the 
chance to participate in various EU activities through close political, security, 
economic and cultural co-operation. We deem that the ENAs objectives will not be 
identical, but will differ to reflect the existing status of relations between the EU and 
each neighbour country, its needs and capacities, as well as common interests. The 
ENAs are preceded by jointly-agreed tailor-made Action Plans, which cover a 
number of key areas specific to each neighbouring country as provided by the ENP: 
1) political dialogue; 2) economic and social development policy; 3) participation in a 
number of EU programmes (education and training, research and innovation); 4) 
sectoral cooperation; 5) market opening in accordance with the principles of the 
WTO and convergence with EU standards; 6) Justice and Home Affairs 




cooperation.27 We speculate that the ENAs will reproduce both general and 
individually tailor-made objectives of the Action Plans. Thus, the general objectives 
of the ENAs will focus on close political, security, economic and cultural 
cooperation with the eventual access of the neighbour countries to the EC internal 
market. Individual objectives of the ENAs will reflect various strategic priorities of 
the EU towards specific neighbour countries. For instance, we expect that the ENAs 
with Mediterranean countries will emphasise enhanced regional cooperation with the 
purpose of ensuring cross-border cooperation, setting up energy networks and 
infrastructure, and the prevention of local conflicts. On the other hand, the ENAs 
with the PCA countries will prioritise the promotion of EU democratic values, 
justice and home affairs cooperation, and anti-corruption and regional security 
issues, all over a purely economic partnership. This is because the EU would prefer 
to have the NIS countries as neighbours with properly functioning democratic 
institutions, and with effective mechanisms for fighting illegal immigration into 
Europe. The stability and security within neighbouring countries is also important 
for the EU. 
Below we attempt to forecast the objectives and scope of the ENA between the EU 
and Ukraine. Our approach is based on the presumption that the scope and nature 
of the objectives of the Ukraine ENA will replicate both the general and individual 
objectives of the EU-Ukraine Action Plan: 1) political dialogue, promotion of 
European and international democratic values, rule of law, human rights and 
fundamental freedoms, ensuring regional and global stability, as well as close 
cooperation in JHA; 2) social and economic development, encouragement of 
structural reforms towards a functioning and competitive market economy, 
limitation of state involvement in the economy and privatisation, liberalisation of 
services including financial sector, social and human development policies, fiscal 
management, monetary and exchange policy; 3) the participation in a number of EU 
programmes (education and training, research and innovation); 4) sectoral 
cooperation in the fields of energy, transport, environment and information society); 
5) market opening in accordance with the principles of the WTO and convergence 
with EU standards; 6) Justice and Home Affairs cooperation in issues of border 
management, migration, fight against terrorism, trafficking in human beings, drugs 
and arms, organised crime, money laundering and financial and economic crimes. 
                                                 
27
 Communication from the European Commission “European Neighbourhood Policy Strategy 
Paper” COM (2004) 373 final. 




This forecast could be supported by the Council Conclusions “concerning the 
negotiation of a new enhanced Agreement between the EU and Ukraine” (the 
Conclusions).28 The Conclusions underline that the future EU-Ukraine ENA will go 
beyond mere economic agreement like sectoral agreements with Switzerland. 
Instead, the future EU – Ukraine ENA will pursue clear economic and political 
objectives: “through this Agreement, the European Union aims to build an 
increasingly close relationship with Ukraine, aimed at gradual economic integration 
and deepening of political co-operation”. Political cooperation between the EU and 
Ukraine is likely to be of cross-pillar character with strong emphasis on security, and 
human rights issues since the final part of the Conclusions emphasises the objective 
of the ENP to “consolidate a ring of prosperity, stability and security based on 
human rights, democracy and the rule of law in the Union’s neighbourhood.” 
After clarifying the potential objectives of the Ukrainian ENA, we seek to associate 
them with specific areas of cooperation, which could be envisaged in the agreement. 
The objective of political dialogue between the EU and Ukraine will target the 
establishment of democratic freedoms, the protection of human rights, free press 
and media in Ukraine. For this purpose, the Preamble of the Ukraine ENA will 
encourage Ukraine to follow EU values and principles as stated in the EU 
Constitution. Specific provisions of the Ukraine ENA will call on Ukraine to adhere 
to recognised international principles and standards (UN Charter, the principles of 
the Helsinki Final Act and the Charter of Paris, the Council of European and the 
OSCE documents). It is most likely that Ukrainian commitments to adopt the EU 
and international human rights and democracy acquis will be underpinned by a 
conditionality clause warning that the ENA could be terminated if Ukraine or the 
EU violates these values and principles. 
The objective of social and economic cooperation will be the opening of access to 
Ukraine of the EU internal market. This could potentially envisage the establishment 
of a free trade area and a mutual recognition regime between the EU and Ukraine. In 
both cases, these objectives will be supported by conditionality and approximation 
clauses. The conditionality clause will foresee the access of Ukraine to EU internal 
market freedoms and the establishment of a free trade area on the progress of 
legislative and regulatory approximation and on the adherence to EU democratic 
values and principles. An approximation clause will impose binding commitments on 
Ukraine similar to those in the latest association agreements (SAAs). Besides, they 
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will envisage specific stages and priorities of the approximation process. For 
example, the Ukrainian ENA would list priority areas of the EU acquis to be 
adopted by Ukraine within specific deadlines. One may argue that these priority 
areas will concern the adoption of the EU competition and state aid acquis, the 
establishment of the principle of non-discrimination, and the liberalisation of the 
Ukrainian services market. Upon the successful adoption of the priority EU acquis, 
Ukraine could be urged to adhere to the dynamic EU acquis within the spheres of 
future mutual recognition agreements. Since the Ukrainian ENA is unlikely to offer 
any prospective of EU membership, one may not expect binding commitments to 
adopt the whole “accession acquis”. Instead, it is most likely that Ukraine will be 
encouraged to continue the process of voluntary harmonisation within areas of 
mutual interest. 
We expect that Ukraine’s participation in EU-funded programmes will concern areas 
of education, culture, and science cooperation. This means that Ukraine will be 
offered access to selected EU-funded programmes (Erasmus Mundus, Socrates), 
conditional on the observance of EU values and principles. Besides, the 
Neighbourhood Instrument will envisage the provision of informational, technical, 
and financial assistance to enable the success of the approximation of law 
programme in Ukraine, as well as closer cooperation in other areas, such as JHA and 
cross-border trade. This assistance will focus on the provision of information on the 
EU acquis, EU institutions, the organisation of training events for Ukrainian 
officials, and legal advice on the approximation process. Of course, all these types of 
assistance could be terminated by the EU in case Ukraine’s potential breach of the 
Union’s values and principles. 
Sectoral cooperation will focus on areas of mutual interest to the EU and Ukraine. 
Taking into consideration the Ukrainian geographic position and the advanced level 
of industrial development, this will concern cooperation within JHA, control on 
illegal immigration, transport, energy, information society, environment, innovation, 
and space. The Provision on the ENA on sectoral cooperation will encourage 
Ukraine to embark upon the voluntary harmonisation of its legislation with the EU 
relevant sectoral acquis. Within areas of particular importance, such as 
environmental protection, competition, state aid, and the control of illegal 
immigration, the ENA could contain the relevant EU acquis in the annexes (if the 
ENA targets the creation of a customs union and/or advanced access of Ukrainian 
undertakings to the EC internal market freedoms). In case that Ukraine does not 
manage to join the WTO at the time of ENA negotiations, it shall definitely envisage 




binding commitments for the Ukraine to adhere to the WTO acquis. For this 
purpose, the Ukrainian ENA will contain direct references to the relevant provisions 
of the WTO agreements in areas of customs, the trade in goods and services, the 
protection of intellectual property, and public procurement. Besides, the fact of 
joining the WTO must constitute a condition for launching free trade area 
negotiations between the EU and Ukraine. Otherwise, the ENA could lose its 
political and economic attractiveness for Ukraine. 
The institutional framework within the ENA will also be determined by the 
objectives of the agreement. The objectives of advanced political dialogue between 
the EU and Ukraine will justify the existence of the three-pillar institutional 
framework: Council, Committee, and Parliamentary Committee. It is not likely that 
the ENA will provide for any degree of informal involvement of Ukraine into the 
EU decision-making procedure. Instead, it is likely to offer an enhanced exchange of 
information on the pending EU acquis. In return, Ukraine could commit itself to 
informing the EU on new laws and regulations which influence the neighbourhood 
partnership with the EU. We argue that objectives of the ENA will determine 
whether the EU/Ukraine joint institutions possess the competence to issue binding 
legal decisions. On the one hand, if the Ukrainian ENA targets mere political and 
economic partnership aims without precise mutual commitments to enhance the 
level of cooperation, it is likely that the EU/Ukraine joint institutions will have 
competence to issue non-binding decisions. On the other hand, if the Ukrainian 
ENA is to contain a perspective of the upgrade of mutual partnership (a free trade 
area, mutual recognition regime), the EU/Ukraine joint institutions could be given 
the power to issue binding decisions that are directly enforceable in Ukraine. This 
would give a decisive competence to the EU/Ukraine common institutions to 
undertake the export of the sectoral acquis into the Ukrainian legal system, by 
analogy with the EU-Turkey Association Council decisions. 
 
5. Expectations on objectives and potential scope of the ENA from Ukraine 
Ukraine proclaimed its European aspirations shortly after independence in 1991. 
Subsequently, Ukraine wholeheartedly subordinated its foreign and domestic policy 
to the objective of integration into international and European political and 
economic structures and, consequently, full membership of the EU. The general 
framework of the integration process was set up in the Strategy of Integration of 




Ukraine into the EU (Strategy of Integration).29 The purpose of this document is to 
declare Ukrainian ambitions to join the EU as soon as possible. Besides, this 
document determines the major priorities of the executive power to fulfil the 
objective of ultimate EU membership.30 Intrinsically, the Strategy of Integration 
proclaims that “joining the European political, economic and legal area and, 
subsequently, acquiring associate membership [emphasis added] of the EU constitute the 
major priority of the Ukrainian foreign policy in the medium term”.31 However, 
numerous political and trade complications in relations between the EU and Ukraine 
as well as the EU pre-occupation with the accession of the Central and Eastern 
European countries in the end of 90ies and early 00ies made the objective of the 
Ukrainian membership in the EU quite uncertain. In 2004 the Parliament of Ukraine 
(Verkhovna Rada) issued Law of Ukraine “On the All State Programme on the 
adaptation of Ukrainian legislation to EU laws” (Programme on adaptation),32 which 
represents a desperate attempt to accelerate the integration of Ukraine into the EU 
on the eve of the “Orange revolution”. This law envisages the export of the whole 
“accession acquis” into the legal system of Ukraine, since the objective of this law is 
the ‘alignment of the Ukrainian legislation with the acquis communautaire taking 
into consideration criteria specified by the EU towards countries willing to join the 
EU’. In other words, Ukraine readily agreed to implement the “accession acquis” on 
a voluntary basis, without any perspective of full EU membership. It should be 
noted that the EU never indicated that voluntary harmonisation would lead to the 
immediate recognition of Ukrainian perspectives to join the EU. Nevertheless, the 
Ukrainian government decided that the harmonisation/adaptation programme 
would be the most expedient way to step into one of waves of the European 
enlargement in the region of Eastern Europe. 
The 2004/2005 “Orange revolution” gave fresh impetus to long-cherished Ukrainian 
aspirations to join the EU. New political elite headed by extremely popular 
opposition leader Viktor Yuschenko encouraged fresh pro-European sentiments 
among the Ukrainian nation. Emotional victory of Viktor Yuschenko in dramatic 
presidential race created impressive worldwide wave of sympathy towards Ukraine. 
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Everyone in Ukraine expected that the EU may reconsider its prudent policy 
towards Ukraine and recognise the Ukraine’s perspective to join the EU sooner or 
later. However, on January 2005 President of the European Commission Jose-
Manuel Barroso clearly stated that there is no perspective for Ukraine to join the EU 
in the nearest future. Instead, EU officials repeatedly articulated that the fulfilment 
of the EU-Ukraine Action Plan (AP) must be a priority for EU-Ukraine relations for 
the immediate future. Consequently, the effective implementation of the AP by 
Ukraine could lead to the enhancement of the EU-Ukraine relations in political, 
economic and legal domains. 
On February 21st 2005 the AP was signed by the European Commission President 
Jose-Manuel Barroso and by Ukrainian Prime-Minister and popular “Orange 
revolution” leader Julia Timoshenko. The signing of the AP was welcomed by 
political elite in Ukraine though in somewhat skeptical way. It became clear that 
Ukrainian pro-European prognoses must be reconsidered in line with more 
pragmatic objectives of the AP. To support that view the EU side reiterated that the 
AP is the major framework document that shapes the format and the character of 
the EU-Ukraine relations in the nearest future. In order to enhance these relations 
Ukraine is expected to acknowledge and to implement the AP. The approximation 
of Ukrainian legislation to that of the EU constitutes one of the top AP priorities. 
Successful implementation of the AP could result in “a new enhanced agreement, 
whose scope will be defined in the light of the fulfilment of the objectives of this 
Action Plan and of the overall evolution of EU – Ukraine relations. The advisability 
of any new contractual arrangements will be considered in due time”. In one year 
term Ukraine has achieved considerable progress in the implementation of the AP. 
The Commission acknowledged “overall progress made on the implementation of 
the EU-Ukraine Action Plan”, especially in areas of: the democratic election process; 
foreign policy and security cooperation; respect of human rights and rule of law; 
market economy reforms and energy cooperation.33 It goes without saying that the 
driving force behind the progress in implementation of the AP by Ukraine was 
almost unanimous political will to move to a new level of bilateral relations with the 
EU and, consequently, to conclude a new enhanced agreement on association with 
the EU instead of the expiring and outdated Partnership and Cooperation 
Agreement (PCA).34 
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The EU’s vision on objectives and the scope of the future ENA with Ukraine have 
not coincided with expectations of the latter. The Council Conclusions “concerning 
the negotiation of a new enhanced Agreement between the EU and Ukraine” omit 
the most desirable objective of the EU-Ukraine relations, which is anticipated by 
Ukraine for most the decade. The Council Conclusions do not mention the 
perspective of the Ukraine’s full EU membership, even in the remote future. Instead, 
the Council and the Commission merely acknowledge Ukraine’s European 
aspirations and welcome Ukraine’s European choice. Leaving the door a bit open the 
Council Conclusions carefully state that “a new enhanced Agreement shall not 
prejudge any possible future developments in EU – Ukraine relations”. The most 
important concern for the Ukrainian side could be the fact that the Council 
Conclusions do not clarify the legal base of the future enhanced agreement. In 
particular, it is not clear if the future enhanced agreement should be negotiated either 
under Article 310 EC on association or Article 308 EC on partnership (similar legal 
base to the PCA). For the Ukrainian side it is essential that the new agreement must 
represent the actual enhancement in mutual relations, and, therefore, to be 
negotiated under Article 310 EC on association. During the latest Ukraine - EU 
troika meeting in Kiev in February 2007 the Ukrainian government openly expressed 
its expectation that “political association [emphasis added] and economic integration” 
of Ukraine to the EU should constitute the major objective of the future enhanced 
agreement.35 
Therefore, taking into consideration the middle and long term objectives of 
Ukrainian policy towards the EU it is possible to envisage two possible frameworks 
of the future ENA, which could satisfy expectations of the Ukrainian political elite. 
In the first case, the future ENA is an association agreement based on Article 310 
EC. It is important for Ukraine that this agreement contains a provision stating a 
remote possibility of the full membership of Ukraine in the EU similar to the EAs 
and SAAs. The future ENA should envisage the creation of a free trade area and 
enhanced level of political and economic cooperation between the EU and Ukraine. 
Within the economic domain it will be important for Ukrainian companies and 
nationals to obtain easy access to some freedoms of the EC internal market, 
especially the freedom of establishment. In the second case, the future ENA could 
omit so irritating for the EU reference to the possible Ukraine’s membership in the 
EU. However, on the expense of absence of the future membership reference the 
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substantive part of the agreement should provide deeper level of economic 
integration of Ukraine into the EC internal market. Of course, it should be 
concluded as agreement on association based on Article 310 EC. Further, the future 
enhanced agreement should foresee the establishment of a free trade area with the 
minimum list exemptions and derogations, and access of Ukrainian nationals and 
companies to freedoms of the EC internal market (movement and establishment). 
Possible analogy for this type of relations could be either the EEA Agreement 
between the EU and EFTA Member States or the EAs. In return for deep political 
and economic integration with the EU Ukraine would accept strong conditionality, 
binding approximation of laws clause and even binding commitments to adhere to 
the homogeneity type relations with the EU. In both cases, the new enhanced 
agreement between Ukraine and the EU should exceed objectives and scope of 
association agreements already concluded by the EU with Mediterranean countries – 
parties to the ENP (for example, agreements with Tunisia, Morocco, and Israel). 
Failure to achieve these objectives (association agreement, deep free trade area, level 
of cooperation higher than between the EU and Mediterranean countries – parties to 
the ENP could be regarded as a failure to fulfil far reaching pro European objectives 
by the ruling “post – Orange revolution” political elite. 
To conclude, we can set out a number of considerations which stem out of the case 
study above. First, our case study indicates that expectations of the EU and Ukraine 
on objectives and the scope of the future ENA are not similar. The EU mandate on 
the future ENA purposefully omits any references to the possibility for Ukraine to 
obtain the full EU membership even in the remote future. Furthermore, the EU 
mandate is not clear whether the future ENA with Ukraine will be concluded as an 
association agreement or a partnership agreement. Second, the EU intention to 
support “political and economic reforms, aimed at further strengthening democracy, 
stability and prosperity in the country” indicate the application of the conditionality 
policy with regard to Ukraine in the future ENA. It could be believed that in opinion 
of the EU the future ENA with Ukraine could be another “transitional” agreement 
aimed at encouraging democratic and market reforms in Ukraine, establishing a free 
trade area under stringent application of the conditionality clause. Third, after 
achieving considerable successes in the implementation of the AP the Ukrainian 
political elite believes that the future ENA should represent a completely new and 
enhanced level of bilateral relations with the EU, which, for sure, must be more 
advanced than existing association arrangements between the EU and some 
Mediterranean countries – participants to the ENP. In other words, the Ukrainian 




foreign policy towards the EU accepts the policy of conditionality, further pro-
European democratic and market reforms, deeper cooperation with the EU in areas 
of security and justice as an intrinsic element of bilateral relations with the EU, 
which will eventually lead to the accession process. 
 
6. Conclusion 
In conclusion it could be argued that the EU asymmetrical external policy towards 
neighbour countries in the “pre-ENP” period with strong emphasis on the accession 
process as a model for the “stick” and “carrot” approach caused major discrepancies 
in perceiving the ENP by some neighbour countries today. The very foundations of 
the ENP could create misunderstanding and certain false expectations between the 
neighbour countries. The conditionality policy borrowed from the “accession 
process” does not correspond to the tailor made approach and relatively weak 
political and economic “carrots” offered by the ENP. Future enhanced ENAs 
provide an excellent chance for both the EU and neighbour countries to overcome 
these discrepancies. 
Conducting a case study on the objectives and scope of the future ENA between the 
EU and Ukraine we noted a considerable impact of the accession policy on the 
expectations of the parties to this agreement. On the one hand, the EU considers 
appropriate to employ various elements of the “pre-accession process” in the future 
ENA (conditionality clause, three-pillar cooperation, voluntary harmonisation of 
legislation). On the other hand, the Ukrainian political elite considers the application 
of various elements of the “pre-accession process” as indispensable condition for 
turning the future ENA to a full fledged road map of the accession of Ukraine into 
the EU. Our study is also useful in highlighting possible compromises, which could 
be found in the course of the future ENA negotiation process between the EU and 
Ukraine. For example, certain objectives, like a free trade area and liberalisation of 
mutual markets of the future ENA indisputably suit interests of the both parties, 
and, therefore, will certainly appear in the text of the future ENA. It would seem 
logical therefore to conclude with the statement that the forthcoming process of 
negotiations of the future ENAs will represent a new stage in the realisation of the 
entire ENP and will lay down new fundamentals of the EU external policy towards 
third countries, which are not likely to join the EU in the nearest future. 
